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Abstract 
What is inside and what is outside the law?
A question that is not easy to answer and that forces legal theory to ask itself about 
which are today the forms of normative production and which are the boundaries of law. 
Through the analysis of the deep transformations of the global legal order and of 
the issues related to the boundaries of law and to the forms of hybrid legality, the essay 
offers a pluralist and dynamic interpretation of the social genesis of law.   
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Boundaries, transnational law, normativity, pluralism
Resumen
¿Qué es lo que está dentro y lo que está fuera del derecho? Es un dilema difícil de 
solucionar, que obliga a la teoría jurídica a interrogarse acerca de las actuales formas 
de producción normativa y de los mismos confines del derecho. A través del análisis 
de las profundas transformaciones del orden jurídico global y de las problemáticas 
que atañen a los confines del derecho y a las formas de juridicidad híbrida, este ensayo 
se presenta como una lectura pluralista y dinámica de la génesis social del derecho.
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1. Pluralistic and transnational dimension of law 
In one of his famous article, John Griffith provokingly wrote that the term “law” 
should be totally deleted today, so to be able to develop a sociological theory using a 
legal pluralism approach.1 This interpretation is tied to self-regulation processes and, 
according to Sally Moore’s ideas2, confines law to a social scope which is only partially 
autonomous but, before the decline of sovereignty of the legal device due to globaliza-
tion processes, it forces legal theory to question itself about which are today the social 
control measures attributable to the legal world, and which are the situations and forms 
of law. 
In his work published in 1986 and entitled “What is legal pluralism?”3, the biggest 
obstacle to a descriptive theory of law had been already identified in legal centralism, 
deeply compromised with the idea that the State factual power is able to guarantee the 
empirical condition for the existence of law: the illusion, the myth of sovereignty that 
follows the directive traced by Bodin-Hobbes-Austin, transposed into the obsession for 
hierarchy of the Grundnorm4 and the rule of recognition of Hart5. 
It is unquestionable that the term “pluralism” is used in many contexts which are 
deeply different from each other, and that it covers a multifaceted semantic area, so that 
is susceptible to many possible variations. In the same way, it is unquestionable that the 
answer to the question about what the law is absorbed ontologically the whole theoret-
ical reflection, and that today, within an extremely non homogeneous and fragmented 
scenario, it appears incredibly complex as it reveals the asymmetry and ambivalence of 
what has been defined the Soft Revolution6 of the global governance. 
1. J. Griffiths, “The Idea of Sociology of Law and its Relation to Law and to Sociology”, in M. Freeman (ed.), Law and So-
ciology: Current Legal Issues, 8, 2006, pp. 63-64. 
2. Sally F. Moore, “Law and social change: the semi-autonomous social field as an appropriate subject of study”, in Law and 
Society Review, 7, 1973, 4, pp. 719-746.
3. J. Griffiths, “What is Legal Pluralism?”, in Journal of Legal Pluralism, 1984, 24, pp. 1-55.
4. H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre. Verlag Franz Deuticke, Wien, 1960.
5. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press, London, 1961.
6. The reference is to M. R. Ferrarese, “Soft Revolution with Hard Political and Legal Effects”, in Soft Power. Revista de Teoría 
e historia de la política, 1, 2014, pp. 35-56 .
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In fact, if the world of modern institutions, together with its legal-political logics 
oriented to coherence within the sovereign system, persists and coexists with the new 
logics of governance and governmentality, which are inspired to economy and which 
are both pragmatic and inclusive but perpetually evaluative and selective, the strength 
of weak links will spread over, lying outside the theoretical structures of legal science, 
involved inside an incessant process of modulation and readjustment among new lan-
guages and traditional archetypes7. Hence, we find ourselves before a horizon pregnant 
with questions rather than answers, ambivalences and difficult choices rather than an-
chorages and achievements, observing discontinuity of forms and porosity of legal edg-
es so that the attempt to clearly draw a unique device-law becomes insidious.
It is actually unquestionable that within the global scene, besides unprecedented 
procedures of legal adjustment –as for example, soft law and lex mercatoria–, different 
types of procedures can be noted. Such procedures become more and more similar to 
the Anglo American types of judge made-law and are the reason why conflict in the 
world is becoming a common practice, in a prospect of a growing proceduralism of the 
legal system. 
This aspect can be contextualized within the general theory of law, within the pros-
pect of a deep reassessment of a pragmatic/argumentative rationality that is originated 
from the improvement of decisional power of courts that becomes crucial for the evo-
lution of transnational law, and that shows a strong theoretical propensity to interpret 
the global nature of law as legal reasoning. The preponderance of the contractual and 
judicial law within the global governance reveals that it is impossible to focus only on 
aspects which are functional to the creation of a system made of proxies and authoriza-
tions within a sovereign system, implying a new modulation of the relationship between 
duty and power, as well as of the dichotomy order/conflict, main feature of the recom-
posing effort of modernity.
If legitimacy criteria of the decisions of transnational law tend to require a new 
interpretation of recognition issues, not only from a sources systematization point of 
view, but above all with respect to the recourse to moral reasoning, the dyad sovereign-
ty-obedience, on which self representation of the modern philosophic-legal thought is 
founded, will weaken. And the long, hard democratic process during which representa-
tion and control have became legitimate, loses its meaning8.
7. As in L. Bazzicalupo, “Editorial”, in Soft Power. Revista de Teoría e historia de la política, 1, 2014, p. 12 and ff.
8. As in L. Bazzicalupo, Politica, identità, potere. Il lessico politico alla prova della globalizzazione, Giappichelli, Torino, 2004, 
p. 103.
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On one side, the fragmentation of the legal system, determined by the global gover-
nance in the way Griffith pointed out, seems to be hardly compatible with the ordering 
need expressed by modernity, so deeply involved with the creation of a formal, hier-
archical structure of the power. On the other hand, a pluralistic interpretation seems 
traditionally to widen disproportionately the borders of legal system, up to the point 
of being unable to explain the systemic, functional differentiation that the whole Luh-
mann’s 9 legacy asks to express. 
Undoubtedly the contemporary theoretical scenario shows how the prestige of law 
authority has become weaken, and in some cases the way in which legal regulation has 
transfigured into a global net made by institutions and organizations, because of which, 
it is particularly hard to draw a line to distinguish the inside and outside of the notion 
of law. Hence, the dissolution of public/private dichotomy radicalizes, through the glo-
balization processes, the normative techniques focused on the deploying of legal effects 
originated by power conferring rules, deflating those that are attributable to the com-
mand theory of law or kelsenian coercive model of the XX century. It seems, then, to 
support Hart’s theory according to which the normative pluralism that deconstructs 
the strong deontic language à la Kelsen develops within the paths of social practices, 
identifying several different itineraries of the normative game.  
Sovereignty myth, its obsession, which leads the law back to a single rule system, 
unified and hierarchical, deeply binded to the features of the national political orga-
nization, which, as we have seen, in Griffith’s concept is attributable to the same XX 
century positivistic methodology, actually in Hart’s concept develops in a normative 
relationship between practices and recognition of law. Such a relationship gives rise to 
a categorial transformation of effectiveness, a factuality actualized in the wittgeinstein-
ian direction into legal normativity. The categorial transformation of a mere fact –a 
convergence of behaviors– into a reason to act, a rule of recognition that, generating 
legitimate expectations, creates a framework of mutual entrustment and presumptions 
of conformity. 
The legacy of linguistic analytic philosophy that identify the essence of linguistic 
games in a number of critic-reflective attitudes related to the idea of following rule, in 
9. In the footsteps of the interpretation in terms of systemic differentiation, see N. Luhmann, Ausdifferenzierung des Rechts 
– Beiträge zur Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie, Suhrkamp Verlag, Berlín 1981, N. Luhmann, R. De Giorgi, Teoria della 
società, Franco Angeli, Milano, 1992; R. De Giorgi, “Il mondo come sistema complesso”, in P. Barcellona, R. De Giorgi, 
S. Natoli (eds.), Fine della storia e mondo come sistema: tesi sulla post-modernità, Dedalo, Bari, 2004, p. 50; A. Febbrajo, Fun-
zionalismo strutturale e sociologia del diritto nell’opera di Niklas Luhmann, Milano, Giuffrè, 1975; Id., Il diritto frammentato, 
(with F. Gambino), Milano, Giuffrè, 2014.
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Hart’s social rule theory is expressed by conventionalism that explains on one side the 
dependence of law on social behavior, and on the other side its normativity, its ability 
to offer reasons to act. The acceptance explains why these reasons are generated, since 
those who accept a norm are also offering it, publicly, as a foundation to guide and 
criticize both their own and others behavior: in this scenario, it is possible to generate a 
mutual and stable pattern which is the heart of the very idea of convention.
Undoubtedly, the pluralism of normative production sources and the progressive 
weakness of the public/private dichotomy cause a new semantic analysis of the legal 
lexicon, just as the emerging of new structures of global power and the porosity of le-
gal edges generate a problematization of social convention concept, as it is understood 
nowadays within the most fragmented legal scenarios ever existed.  
The weakening of autoreferentiality of law and of the attempt of neutralization of 
conflicts traditionally attributable to the modern paradigm, and as consequence of the 
myth, the illusion of sovereignty, seems to cause a better fluidity of the concept of “la”’ 
in relation to areas that, until a short time ago, were subject exclusively to legal authori-
ty, so noticing an osmosis between legal and economic-financial fields identified by pro-
cesses of local and institutional encapsulation of economic globalization. Such osmosis 
on one side is generative of a new cartography of global law, according to the variable 
geometry10 in which the constitutive elements of the political dimension are re-written 
according to the weak version –territory, authority, rights– and produce new assemblag-
es11 of national and global features, within the new systemic global fragmentation. 
The assembly metaphor has been used by Sassen to generate a new profile of con-
tingency and dynamism of the global scenario in which new geometries of power, 
which are generating the denationalization phenomenon illustrated by Sassen, are 
constantly trying to conform to the space-time dimension and to the interconnection 
generated time by time between national and global, within a polycentric but never 
conclusive net. 
It is undoubted that several and unknown power configurations can be noticed on 
the global scene characterized by a structural flexibility, so as it is certain that the nev-
er conclusive process of transition from hierarchy to the net evokes a reconsideration 
of some fundamental issues, for example the problematization of the dyad obligation/
power starting from the participation demands so often expressed by pluralistic ideas 
10. See M.R. Ferrarese, La governance fra politica e diritto, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2010.
11. S. Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2006, 
especially I, Assembling the National, and part 2 Disassembling the National. 
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or starting from an active12 use of law, that has to be protected, inevitably through a 
methodological-cognitive demand.
It is the cognitive demand of positivistic methodology that, contrary to what Griffith 
thought, with Kelsen overtakes the sovereignty dogma refusing the extreme subjectivism 
of the State in the name of an objectivistic idea of law based on the supremacy of interna-
tional law and on the anti-ideological tendency of Legal Science, or recomposes it, in Hart, 
inside the empiric-normative dimension of recognition acts by the officials in charge of 
the application/identification of law –in this interpretation, considered a social practice.
Today, we assist to a softening of the dichotomy convention/cooperation developed 
by the legal philosophic thought, as well as to a interpretation of legal positivism, de-
pending on its autoreferentiality and practical authority in regard to moral values, into 
the forms of soft and hard positivism13: an osmosis between law and morality inside 
the same criteria of legal validity, that in some cases seems to tone down the category 
of recognition to a moral acceptance, an adhesion to values, to the practice of rights, 
presented as basically homogeneous, rooted inside the processes of judge made-law of 
the global systems. 
To which extent, today, within a context ruled by multiple power vectors, it is really 
appropriate to turn down the need for anti-ideological disclosure by a jurisprudence 
that from an assessment point of view is not engaged?
Tension between the powers that are acted into a social pattern, between antithetical 
views of the world, between rights and economic interests, between irreconcilable moral 
points of view, should not encourage us not to loosen the dialectic, the one that belongs 
to the whole modern tradition, between recognition and consensus?           
12. Such participation demands from all partners, connected to logic-formal recognition, represents the core of A. Cata-
nia’s works, “Che cos’è il diritto?”; “Che cos’è la decisione”, both published in V. Giordano (ed.), Effettività e modelli norma-
tivi. Studi di Filosofia del diritto, Giappichelli, Torino, 2013, respectively pp. 3-12 and pp.71-80. 
13. The debate about soft and hard positivism is very wide and is related to the way in which separability thesis is meant. In 
fact, the idea that exists a not necessary connection between law and morals, so as it is expressed by H. L. A Hart, “Positiv-
ism and the Separation of Law and Morals”, in Harvard Law Review, 71, 593-626, is reinterpreted in a weak version by soft 
positivism as separableness between law and morals, where the idea of contingency becomes central. About this interpre-
tation, see, J. Coleman, “Negative and Positive Positivism” (1982), in J. Coleman, Markets, Morals and the Law, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 3-27; J. Coleman (ed.), Hart’s Poscript, Essay on the Postscript to the Concept of Law, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001; J. Coleman, The Practice of Principle. In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal 
Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001. 
W. J. Waluchow, Inclusive Legal Positivism, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994; J. J. Moreso, “In Defence of Inclusive Legal 
Positivism”, in P. Chiassoni (ed.), in The Legal Ought, Giappichelli, Torino, 2001, pp. 37- 63. From the hard positivism 
perspective, where the separability thesis is re-read as a necessary separation between legal and moral areas, see J. Raz, The 
Authority of Law. Essays on Law and Morality, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979. 
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2. Softness in global governance 
Soft seems thus to be the adjective that might represent the global language. Soft 
power14, soft law15, soft positivism reshape the cartography of the global scenario remodeling 
the forms of modern rationality, even if without totally cancelling the preexisting logics, 
getting nourished exactly from unstable, heterogeneous balances, which are inevitably 
precarious but suitable for the incessant change of the pluralistic structures of powers, 
within an incessant logic of compatibility and conflict, hybridization of categories tradi-
tionally represented from a dialectic point of view.
Soft power can be traditionally16 described as the other side of the hard power,17 thus, 
not fitting to coercive/repressive modalities: the attraction becomes dominant also 
within the net of legal relationships of a power weakened of its ability to impose itself 
and that uses, then, persuasive methods which are able to model people’s preferences, 
orienting actions in an alternative way from the initial strategies.18
It is a soft, widespread power that reveals a scenario of unequal, intermittent, con-
ditioned powers which have widespread –through the modern and postmodern po-
litical and economic socialization– through all the forces of society where mutually 
14. The expression “Soft power” was first used by J. Nye, “The misleading metaphor of decline,” in The Atlantic Monthly, 
March 1, 1990, pp. 86-94. In that essay the author claims that if the United States were to follow policies that cut domestic 
consumption by the two percent of GNP by which it rose in the past decade, the richest country in the world could afford 
both better education at home and the international influence that comes from an effective aid and information program 
abroad. What is needed is increased investment in “soft power,” the complex machinery of interdependence, rather than in 
“hard power” –that is, expensive new weapons systems. 
15. Literature about the soft law is immense. Just as an example, see A. Somma, Soft law and hard law nelle società post-mod-
erne, Giappichelli, Torino, 2009.
16. The most important definition of soft power has been developed by J. Nye, “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World 
Politics”, in Public Affairs, New York, 2004, p. 6-7: “Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. In the 
business world, smart executives know that leadership is not just a matter of issuing commands, but also involves leading 
by example and attracting others to do what you want. Similarly, contemporary practices of community-based policing 
rely on making the police sufficiently friendly and attractive that a community wants to help them achieve shared objec-
tives. […] Soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important 
part of it. It is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence. Simply put, in behavioral terms, soft 
power is attractive power. Soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction.
17. “Hard and soft power are related because they are both aspects of the ability to achieve one’s purpose by affecting the 
behavior of others. The distinction between them is one of degree, both in the nature of the behavior and in the tangibility 
of the resources”: J. Nye, “Soft Power”, p. 7.
18. “Soft co-optive power is just as important as hard command power. If a state can make its power legitimate in the eyes 
of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly 
follow. If it can establish international norms that are consistent with its society, it will be less likely to have to change. 
If it can help support institutions that encourage//other states to channel or limit their activities in ways the dominant 
state prefers, it may not need as many costly exercises of coercive or hard power in bargaining situations. In short, the 
Universalism of a country’s culture and its ability to establish a set of favorable rules and institutions that govern areas of 
international activity are critical sources of power”. J. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, Basic 
Books, New York, 1990, pp. 32-33. 
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conditioning relationships are composed, from high and from below, multiple and 
heterogeneous.19
A scenario overflowing with disparate, cross vectors of powers that fits inside the 
law structure in a variety of acting spaces. Acting spaces ruled by using the legal device 
through voluntary negotiation among partners, for example, in contract drafting, or 
through multiple and diverse forms of legal mediation, including also the alternative 
dispute resolution, and even the flexible and agile tools of soft law. A soft power, then, 
irregular in comparison to a hard one, that can fit within the power conferring rules 
structure which generates Hart’s normative pluralism, incentivizing and disincentiviz-
ing the exercise of the subjective rights of individuals, their facultas agendi, manifesting, 
within the practical-political activity related to the use of the legal device, in multiple 
subjectivization processes20. 
A legal universe, then, more and more characterized by forms of legal self-regulation 
very distant from traditional normative tools. This is the case of soft law, whose binding 
force is often controversial, even though characterized by an increasing efficacy and 
pervasiveness. It concerns, as it is well known, both the European governance regula-
tion, which is influential within the community borders, and the one that comes from 
the “globalization factual institutions”21 within the commercial and financial area (for 
example, city takeover code, corporated governance code), which show, regardless their 
ambiguous legal nature, a clear inclination towards increasing levels of enforcement. 
It is not insignificant, according to this interpretation, the reception of some rules 
of soft law within the directives of the European Union, and their use, with no doubt 
controversial and disputed, in the indirect integration of criminal norms22.
It is a mostly technical rule, that refers to the recommendations, the opinions and all 
preparatory acts of European institutions, even outside the normative prevision of arti-
cle 249 of the European Community Treaty, which has undoubtedly made more prob-
lematic and complex the whole system of the sources of the international regime, since 
it shows deviations from that same system that reveal the steps of decision processes 
19. “It is a form of rationality that makes of the mechanism of interdependencies, of the co-existence of heterogeneous 
techniques and styles the vehicle for government processes that do not operate through the mechanism of coercion (al-
though we will never grow tired of arguing that they co-exist with it), but rather aim to produce subjectivations appropriate 
for a unstable world, and power relations referred to individuals or free associations that remain active even when they find 
themselves in the weakest and subordinate position in an asymmetric power relationship”: L. Bazzicalupo, “Editorial”, p. 13. 
20. About subjectivization processes, cfr. A. Tucci, “Crossing the borders of governance”, in Soft Power. Revista de Teoría e 
historia de la política, 1, 2014, specially pp. 71 e ff.
21. The expression is by M.R. Ferrarese, Le istituzioni della globalizzazione, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2000.
22. For an in-depth analysis, see N. Boister, R. J. Currie (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Transnational Criminal Law, Rout-
ledge, London, 2015.
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of global governance. A multilevel system that falls outside the pyramidal structure of 
legal science, conferring importance to multiple, different subjects, especially within 
the commercial and financial area: as an example, we can mention the best practices 
of controlling systems on global scale considered as authentic referring patterns and 
guidelines, extremely binding for many national systems.
The question if it is a graduated normativity23 is a theoretically complex one, and it is 
strictly dependent on the importance attributed to social practices, as well as to the per-
vasive use of this kind of forms and, thus, necessarily related to the available definition 
of the law. But it is out of doubt that we are dealing with legal procedures that some-
times are not easily distinguishable, through a binary logic, from hard law techniques24 
and that recall, for the legal self-regulation, those common customary practices that 
were typical of premodern law. This aspect is particularly clear in the current lex merca-
toria that, being flexible and having formed from the lower levels, for many aspects has 
evoked new forms of medievalism25, the idea of a global law without a State26. 
In this last interpretation, lex mercatoria is considered as the transnational law of 
economic transactions, that causes a decentralization of political juridification and the 
production of new forms of “heterarchy”: from hierarchy/to center-periphery. This last 
distinction on one side, reproduces the dichotomy internal/external to the law, without 
ignoring the legality of peripheral production of law in which are placed the politi-
cal legislation and the forms of governance regulation; on the other side, rebuilds the 
dimension of law within a structural coupling with normativity processes that refer 
to different social system, characterized by distinctive and contradictory rationalities: 
“private” autonomous legal regimes explain the irrevocable crisis of modernity project, 
of legal fragmentation and, hence, of the “king’s many bodies”.27 
That implies reconsideration and a complexification of the translation/betrayal 
processes between different languages, logics and systemic codes. Before the falling of 
23. For a more detailed study, see B. Pastore, “Soft Law y la teoría de las fuentes del derecho”, in Soft Power. Revista de Teoría 
e historia de la política, 1, 2014, pp. 81 e ff. About the idea that soft law is in the penumbra of law, see A. Peters, “Soft Law as 
New Model of Governance”, in U. Diedrichs, W. Reiners and W. Wessels (eds.), The Dynamics of Change in EU Governance. 
Studies in EU Reform and Enlargement series, Edward Elgard Publishing, Northampton (Mass.), 2011, p. 23.
24. About the refusal of the binary logic, see K. W. Abbot, D. Snidal , “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance”, in 
International Organization, 54, 3, 2000, pp. 421-456; O. Perez, “Private Environmental Governance as Ensemble Regulation: 
A Critical Exploration of Sustainability Indexes and the New Ensemble Politics”, in Theoretical Inquires in Law, 12, 2, 2011, 
pp. 543-579. 
25. P. Grossi, Prima lezione di diritto, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2003.
26. G. Teubner, “Global Bukovina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society”, in G. Ten (ed.), Global Law without a State, Alder-
shot, Dortmouth, 1977, pp. 3-28.
27. G. Teubner, “The Kings many Bodies: The Self-Deconstruction of Law’s Hierarchy”, in Law and Society Review, 4, 1997, 
pp. 763-787.
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hierarchies and the generation of normative expectations, Teubner’s theory is that law 
de-constructed itself according to polycontextual key, through the intersection of soci-
ety subsystems generated from heterogeneous spheres of interest and fields. Different 
normative codes, contradictory rationalities coming from economic and other social 
areas, as science, technology, mass media, health care, education etc., reproduce within 
the legal scenario those structural conflicts already existing among functional systems, 
generating each time new compatibilities and new disputes. What is changing, then, is 
the geometry of legal conflicts. 
A possible interpretation of legal globalization processes that in rewriting the map 
of conflicts disjoints it from the dimension of space and territory, and entrenches it 
into the encounter/clash between heterogeneous normative codes and incompatible 
communicative matrix. Whose mediation is entrusted to the progressive institution-
alization into a networking pattern of society fragments, that is to say to the pro-
cesses of self-constitutionalization28 and, thus, ultimately to the risk of metaphysical 
self-regulation of the market. 
Undoubtedly, it is an interpretation of globalization that allows us to take the theme 
of law’s borders seriously, with a new interpretation of legal decentralization within the 
perspective of a greater and greater systemic reflexivity, with a sociologically centered 
view on the characters of the global scenario. In this sense, Teubner’s pluralism high-
lights how the participation moment and the role of subjects are inescapable. Never-
theless, it seems that entrusting in self-regulation forms means to underestimate the 
social and political conflict, even if Teubner’s interpretation is not based in principle on 
a non-conflicting and pacified society.29
In the combination of functional differentiation what is still missing is the impartial 
third party, that is to say the identification of a third guarantor of the processes of insti-
tutionalization of conflicts that refer to the incessant processes of constitutionalization 
which are so confined inside the perimeter outlined by the rationality and autopoietic 
ability of the system. 
Finally, if we downgrade the law to a social field that is only partially autonomous, 
we end unavoidably to reduce its demand of neutralization of conflicts, its ability to act 
as a “stabilizing” tool of pretensions rooted inside the society, to orient, at the end, social 
behaviors, practical choices, briefly the collective acting.  
28. G. Teubner, Verfassungsfragmente: Gesellschaftlicher Konstitutionalismus in der Globaliesierung, Suhrkamp Verlag, Berlín, 
2012.
29. On these themes, see A. Tucci, Immagini del diritto. Tra fattualità istituzionalistica e agency, Giappichelli, Torino, 2012, 
pp. 97-98.
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Can a lucid acknowledgement of the polytheism of rationalities really combine with 
the recognition of a practical authority of law, with the possibility that still today law, its 
technique, is a tool of reasonable transactions?
3. can conventionalism be not essentialist?
Within the theoretical general debate, except the legal pluralism model called 
“monotypic”, that is to say based on a definition of law that includes the relationship 
with an enforcement of institutional rules, or with “many self-regulated semiautono-
mous social fields” à la Teubneir, has also been outlined a version that we can call non 
“essentialist”30, in which pluralism element does not rely on legal notions and there is no 
attempt to identify the functionalist side. 
For this specific interpretation of legal pluralism, law has not to be built as a sci-
entific category, inevitably ascribable to state system, nor as a single concept or single 
definition, but as a many-sided phenomenon that goes beyond the structural/function-
al dialectic and settles inside the processes of recognition by the members of a group. 
Hence, law cannot be represented as a totality of element that one can include into a 
“formulaic description”, neither it can be considered as something that has to guarantee 
order, coordinate expectations of social behaviors, resolve social conflicts through an 
institutional path. These definitions are vitiated by the obsession to identify the essence, 
the heart of law, that is nothing else than what the participants think it is. 
A non “essentialist” perspective that identifies the legal pluralism in the multiplicity 
of forms with which the legal system reveals itself and is identified –state law, habits, 
lex mercatoria–, but inherits the conceptual cornerstone of Herbert Hart’s convention-
alism, the idea of the law as a social practice, even if the interpretation proposed is not, 
somehow, disengaged from the psychological moment and is tied to the critic/reflective 
attitude of those who take part to the system. 
Undoubtedly, the ambivalence of Hart’s notion of convention, in which Searle’s di-
alectic between regulative rules and constitutive rules31 has been transposed, is clearly 
30. B. Z. Tamanaha, “A non Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism”, in Journal of Law and Society, 27, 2, 200, pp. 296-321.
31. “Regulative rules regulate a pre-existing activity, an activity whose existence is logically independent of the rules. Cons-
titutive rules constitute (and also regulate) an activity the existence of wich is logically dependent on the rules: J. R. Searle, 
Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1969, p. 34. About recognition 
rule as a regulative rule, see J. Coleman, “Incorporationism, Conventionality, and Practical Difference thesis”, in J. Coleman 
(ed.), Hart’s Poscript, pp.1232-147; in the same volume, about the recognition rule as a constitutive rule, A. Marmor, Legal 
Conventionalism, pp. 193-217. 
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expressed by the global processes of judge made-law, reflecting the complex nature of 
the empiric-constitutive root that binds actualized practices and normativity game.
If preserving a logic-cognitive demand for the operations of recognition before the 
proliferation of source of normative production and the unprecedented flexibility of 
legal forms seems inescapable, it is also true that the constitutive root of effectiveness is 
claimed by those who are part of the system with the use of the game rules within a form 
of normativity that is compulsorily legal. But, in this case it is necessary to know the 
game rules, the goal set of players, the penalties to ascribe for the violations to required 
behavior: briefly, the definition of the game.
Such an aspect proves to be impossible if we have to adhere to a form of non-essen-
tialist conventionalism. 
Within this context, in fact, the attempt to reject the central objection posed to legal 
pluralism, concerning the possibility to distinguish law from any other form of social 
life, proves to dissolve into an idea of convention that is deprived of any normative ele-
ment and as such is incapable to discriminate in regards to the configuration of psycho-
logical aspects and attitudes of internalization. Hence, it is not able to delimit the edges 
of the normativity game.
Undoubtedly, the heart of this interpretation is Hart’s social rule idea that identi-
fies, according to the artificialism, the existence of a legal obligation with the norma-
tivity generated by a shared practice; nevertheless, the exclusively sociological view, 
“moderate external”, adopted in this approach does not allow to identify in which 
manners law can orient social behavior, offering reasons why one should adhere to 
the practice itself. The attention to the belief of actors of global arena and never on 
their demands for conformity and expectations of normativity seems to break the 
short circuit of empiric-normative origin generated by the attitude of participants, 
in the same way that the refusal of any form of functionalism related to the role of 
the law does not allow to identify the specificity of legal normativity, the exclusivity 
of its notion.
In other words, what is missing in the concept of “non-essentialist legal pluralism” 
is the internal point of view. The view of the participant. The view of someone who 
not only has a belief about what the law is inside the society, but also of anyone who 
demands the adoption of the legal practice because external conformity is part of the 
reason to follow a rule, so as the expectation of legal implementation represents a key 
element for the social construction of the law. In this perspective, what is missing then 
is the construction, in terms of collective intentions and shared expectations, of the 
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social convention concept, what determines the categorial transformation of the factual 
moment that is immanent to Praxis into a normative phenomenon, into a dimension 
of legal binding force.
For some aspects, this concept allows to extend law identification to the immanence 
of social practice, going beyond the risk of a statist reductionism thanks to the recog-
nition of multiple forms with which global legal normativity is covered. On the other 
hand, because of the decline of normative elements and the choice not to define the 
differential concepts of law in comparison to other social phenomenon, it seems to gen-
erate a vicious circle, unable to grasp a concept, even in its minimal form, of practical 
authority of law. It is clear that, in comparison to hard positivism perspectives in which 
the separation thesis is reinterpreted according to the strong version –in the definition 
of rules as exclusionary reasons 32– the importance of legal tool to neutralize the practi-
cal conflict, the position of non-essentialist pluralism disengages the legitimacy of glob-
al systems from any structural and functional element of law. But, it does not manage, 
through this distancing, to confer it any practical difference within decisional context, 
in any form of deliberative process.
Undoubtedly then, the risk of a too deformed image is very high. If, as Tamanaha 
claims33, the current tendency of legal theory is a sociologic approach, it is necessary not 
to forget that social practice is not just a mere empiric device. It is the critic-reflective 
attitude of the participants of the system, in that vital twist, the constitutive and plural-
ist twist of the normative puzzle, transforms a mere empiric convergence into a pretense 
of binding force that ends up building the practice itself as a tool to control/orient but 
also to exclude/include legal normativity.
4. The social construction of law: conventional games 
It would be possible, then, from this perspective, to import from Griffith, the the-
oretical assumption that pluralism is a fact, a social fact, whose construction in legal 
terms is a duty of the general theory of law. An undoubtedly complex task that includes 
the description of legal reality, today within an enigmatic context which demands to 
give a voice to claim of normativity not always externally covered with a legal form, but 
32. B. Z. Tamanaha, “A non Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism”, p. 313.
33. B. Z. Tamanaha, “The Internal/External Distinction and the Notion of a ʻPracticeʼ in Legal Theory and Sociolegal Stu-
dies”, in Law & Society Review, 30, 1 (1996), p. 201.
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in which the need to describe does not prove to be, as in the non essentialist convention-
alism, tainted by a definitional gap. And, in this perspective, to reinterpret the normativ-
ity of transnational law as a question of degree, in which the concept of social pressure 
that innervates Hart’s perspective and founds the dialectic between social habits/social 
and legal rules will give back new compatibilities and new conflicts of the social business 
that necessarily proves the irreducibleness of the political/decisional character and the 
partiality of legal synthesis.
Then, an inter-institutional interpretation that could read again the legal aspects of 
global law as a dynamic process, of social construction, between practices and norma-
tivity play probably would be able to avoid the transfiguration of the legal normativity 
and at the same time, not to darken those aspects of contingency, intermittence, that 
highlight a current paradoxical disequilibrium of effectiveness over the normative di-
mension of law.34
The inter-institutional normativity is contingent, intermittent and can blur within 
the global governance those fundamental theoretical assumptions –objectivity and per-
manence of organizations– that characterized the positions of traditional legal institu-
tionalism, à la Romano. Nevertheless, it enables to inflect in the plural, according to a 
multilevel version, those legal decisions that emerge from practices, if they can provide 
a certain degree of intensity and interaction35, giving back each time areas of normative 
inclusion/exclusion, unstable balances and forms of legal representation. 
An interpretation, thus, in terms of compatibility between soft power and hard pow-
er, but also necessarily in conflict; the type of conflict that generates the same social 
construction as the law does, within an irregular path where legal system can be active 
or inactive, where you can have battles, claims and defeats. 
In this perspective, then, we should not disregard the essence of law, the fact that law 
is a tool for social regulation. And it is just in relation to social regulation that it has to 
make a difference, offering –with its capacity to neutralize conflict– tools for normative 
orientation, reasons to act.
If the convention is not simply an actualized practice, but a constitutive rule or a 
coordinative rule that provides for an absent agreement36, counterbalancing the choice 
between divergent options, the categorial transformation of a mere convergence of 
34. In this interpretation of global normativity, see K. Culver, M. Giudice, Legality Borders: An Essay in General Jurispruden-
ce, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010.
35. For an in-depth analysis, see K. Culver, M. Giudice, Legality Borders, p. 99.
36. The idea that conventions do not give for granted an agreement but that they are an alternative way to obviate to an 
absent agreement is by D. Lewis, Convention: A Philosophy Study, Harvard University Press, Mass., 1969. 
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behaviors into a conventional practice cannot neglect to identify the game rules and the 
function of the game. A construction of legal reality that starts, then, from the defini-
tional elements through which social practices are established and from the purpose of 
the convention itself, starting from which it is impossible not to characterize the essence 
of law, the nature of legal normativity.
Of course, weakening the project for the conditioning and controlling of modern 
representation requires a new semanticization of legal lexicon, a decline of the deontic 
linguistic structure, so as it is undoubted that together with the persistence of statist 
root of law come up a more and more binding factuality, actualized practices character-
ized by a strong social interaction that go beyond the monolithic limit of systems and 
get placed inside the transnational net of global institutions. 
Undoubtedly, a possible way to account for transnational legality could be eluding 
the dichotomy of validity/applicability of law37, in which the essential aspects of law end 
up being inflated in a process of endless abstraction and separation between national 
systems and sources of heterogeneous kind, and a revaluation of the pluralist demands 
coming from global area, looking at the levels of institutionalization of social pressure 
through which Hart discerned between legal and social normativity.
But, we have to assume that law is a tool for social stabilization. And that, filtering, it 
juridificates expectations of legal implementations that depend on the circle of recog-
nition originated from the belief/claim of normativity38, that represents the conceptual 
cornerstone, the heart, of any normative game. So, it is not a tacit approval of the law 
system towards forms of graduated normativity coming from the organizational net 
on the global scene, but an active, explicit approval, actualized in social practices, in the 
encounter/clash that generates the social construction of law.
A social construction made by numerous, not always identifiable, often changing 
actors, characterized by irregular paths and arduous itinerary, by forms of intermittent 
and discontinuous normativity: but that will not help to deliver us –on the edges of 
law– the dynamic, pluralist genesis of legal practices.
Translation by Stefania Rega
37. This strategy is adopted by J. Raz, The Autority of Law, pp. 101-102.
38. On this conceptual couple, Catania based his interpretation of normativity in A. Catania, Metamorfosi del diritto. Deci-
sione e norma nell’età globale, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2008.
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